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is largely due to the way are seen at government level some fundamental concepts of cash flow, profitability 
and profit. Lack notions of profit and profitability or their understanding are visible in regulatory acts governing 
the rules in the decision on concessions, public-private partnerships and public investments. As companies use 
methods of fundament investments more advanced, state remains locked in a set of static, outdated and 
insufficient to substantiate decisions that govern economic results over a extended period.  
 Our approach starts from examining financial problem that raises concession following a dynamic 
uncertainty. In our opinion, the lack of information about the future makes any initial negotiation that concludes 
with a fix price to be a mistake in the negotiation of any type of lease. Looking at concessions from tow 
perspectives related to uncertainty and time irreversibility of the contract we propose a specific solution to 
evaluate it and finally its price using the methodological approach of real options. Real examination of the 
financial attractiveness of PPP contracts is a very difficult task especially because of some special sources like 
the long development time of the PPP contracts, the uncertainty of future prices and costs, effect on state 
revenue, lost of natural resources, social impact, and risk of the future legal operating conditions. The main 
approach to the evaluation of PPP contracts decisions by public managers is the use of benefit/cost ratio (B/C), 
traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques such as the net present value (NPV), land expectation value 
(LEV in the case of forestry exploitations), and internal rate of return (IRR). The main deficiency with these 
approaches is the failure to evaluate the managerial flexibility induced by uncertainty.  
In this paper, we present an example of the use of the real options approach to model flexibility and 
uncertainty in gold mining investment analysis from the perspective of the value created for the state by a 
concession contract. 
As companies use methods of fundament investments more advanced, state remains locked in a set of static, 
outdated and insufficient to substantiate decisions that govern economic results over a very extended period. 
These things are made worse by a lack of information on the development of certain economic indicators 
related to developments of different raw material prices due to a focus only on macroeconomic indicators and a 
lack of monitoring indicators allowing the state to become a decision-maker who rely on same means they use 
and private companies. 
Given the fact that in the private economic environment is constantly appearing new concepts and the 
companies are constantly improving their decision-making system is up to the government as decision-making 
body to adapt their organizational practices to compete and negotiate on the same foundation with competing 
companies or partners. 
Our approach starts from examining financial problem that raises concession following a dynamic 
uncertainty. In our opinion, the lack of information about the future makes any initial negotiation that concludes 
with a fix price to be a mistake in the negotiation of any type of lease. On the other hand, the concession 
decision should be viewed as an investment with a high degree of irreversibility. Looking at concessions from 
both perspectives related to uncertainty and time irreversibility of the contract we propose a specific solution to 
evaluate it and finally its price using the methodological approach of real options. 
This approach allows us to capture the relationship between government, or any other public resources 
manager, and the private concessionaire in terms of concession value created for both state and private 
concessionaire. 
Analyzing the natural resources owned by the state, first we should assess two alternative actions that the 
government has at its disposal: the direct use of natural resources and lease them to private exploitation. The 
appeal to the concession system must be justified only by the case in which operation by leasing development 
brings more benefits than the direct investment. This is possible only in case if the private management 
efficiency is higher than that one resulted from direct exploitation by the state. 
Usually, concession contracts and public –private partnership are, in the best-case scenario, evaluated based 
on two principles: cost benefit analysis based on the net present value criteria and on political considerations. 
The uncertainty valuations represents, at best, only on a heuristically approach based on risk factor 
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identification but with no quantitative model to evaluate the impact of risk on project value. This approach is 
not only insufficient in the terms of understanding the impact of the risks on project value but also does not 
offers a correct analysis of the dynamic decision making possibilities offered by the flexibility induced by 
uncertainty and the potential of further learning. If the public sector is unaware of the options values of the 
investment project related to a concession contract, it is possible that significant options value will be lost by 
from public sector in favor of private companies.  
 
Real options on concession contracts - theoretical approach  
 
Effective evaluation of the financial value of PPP contracts is a very complex task due to, among other 
reasons, the long development horizon of PP contracts, uncertainty of future prices and costs, effect on state 
revenue, lost of natural resources, social impact, and uncertainty of the future legal operating conditions. The 
main approach to analyzing concession contracts decisions by public managers is the use of benefit/cost ratio 
(B/C), traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques such as the net present value (NPV) and internal rate 
of return (IRR). The main deficiency with these approaches is the failure to evaluate the managerial flexibility 
induced by uncertainty.  
The main problem with this investment evaluation methods is that the all this analysis are linear and static in 
nature and assumes that either the investment opportunity is reversible or irreversible it is a now-or-never 
opportunity (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). These limitations render the conclusions of DCF valuation somewhat 
suspect and using it can under evaluate the concession value. 
Private managers tend to use increasingly new investment appraisal methods. If the state remains limited at 
some static methods the loss from the concession contracts, can be significant on long term. Analyzing specific 
literature, we can find that concession and public private partnership are extensively debated from the point of 
view o private management using real options theory. On the other hand there are few research papers that 
evaluate the concession and public-private partnership investment projects as real options from the state 
perspective. Even more national regulations and European regulations do not present any reference to real 
options valuation when referring to how to evaluate this type contracts and the value brought for the state. 
New and more convincing valuation and decision making of an investments in projects can be done 
according to real option theory, as argued by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) ; Trigeorgis (1996) ; Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001). In our opinion this type of valuation should not be avoided by state when tries to evaluate his 
own revenue from concession contracts. 
Classical real options models try to identify a linked portfolio of traded assets that has same risk as that of 
the project and same returns (cash flows). In this case, the project cash flows are evaluated by identifying a 
portfolio trading strategy that generates the same cash flows as the project’s cash flow.  
Because it is very difficult to identify a portfolio of traded assets that exactly imitate risks and returns of the 
investment project, sometimes is impossible to do so, Copeland and Antikarov (2001) proposed a simpler 
approach free from any market-traded asset. This new simpler approach is based on the marketed asset 
disclaimer (MAD) assumption.  MAD technique uses the present value of a project without options as the best-
unbiased estimate for the market value of the project Copeland and Antikarov (2001). The MAD assumption 
eliminates the difficulty of identifying a twin portfolio of linearly independent securities that can generate the 
same risk and cash flow as the project. 
The analysis makes use of standard tools of option pricing and investment in discrete time, using the 
multiplicative binomial approach (Cox et al., 1979 ) based on MAD assumption. The binomial process was 
chosen because is the simplest of the option pricing formulas (Elton and Gruber, 1995 ). This is because in the 
binomial model we can check at every point of the option’s lifetime the likelihood of prompt exercise. In 
addition, the binomial model does not depend on the prospect of certain special conditions. This implies that the 
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real options model is not dependent of investors that have subjective probabilities about an upward and/or 
downward movement in the underlying asset, probabilities that are not the same with those of the project.  
The model requires the introduction of limitations will allow the state to control the outcome, in the event 
that the beneficiary's financial results are better than the initial expected value of the concession.  
If VL is the maximum financial assessment imposed by the concession or PPP. In relation to the type of 
restriction, imposed VL can be determined in the following way: 
Let L be the upper limit of profitability imposed by the concession contract.  
In these conditions, VL can be determined in the following way: 
 
 
 
 
 
Where pa is the share retained by the private partner in relation to the excess yield results, and Vc - is the 
amount transferred to the state project as a result of exercising the option of limiting the yield. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In these conditions, assessing the value of the concession made by the state becomes dependent on the result 
of the operation of the investment objective and can be determined using the same reasoning used by private 
companies when turning to real options theory.  
In this context, the value resulting from the concession or PPP will be dependent on two sets of options that 
are accessed at the same time by the state and by the private partner. Under these conditions, the value of the 
project is linked to both decision maker. This fact compels their cooperation in the future to ensure optimum 
value for each of the partners of the concession contract. 
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